Introduction: The West has for decades used "color revolutions" to overthrow governments or serve as cover for militant groups to do so. The mechanics of a color revolution are best described by US-funded Albert Einstein Institute's Gene Sharp and his book, "From Dictatorship to Democracy."
While this book has been used by various fronts of the US State Department, the CIA, and other corporate financier-backed insurrections, it is a double-edged sword that those seeking to uproot Wall Street's various proxy regimes can also use.
Others, seeing no prospect of achieving democracy, may conclude they must come to terms with the apparently permanent dictatorship, hoping that through “conciliation,” “compromise,” and “negotiations” they might be able to salvage some positive elements and to end the brutalities.
The regime also has considerable control over the police. Again, while the heads of police departments are deeply in the pocket of Thaksin Shinawatra, the rank and file often brought in from across the northeast to quell protests are only following orders and may not agree or support the regime as fanatically as their superiors. Offering them a hand and a way out from under despotic/illegal/inhumane orders is preferable to combative postures that only give them further reasons to fight on and follow orders.
IN THAILAND: Thailand already has a large number of independent institutions that exist beyond the regime's control. Many can be seen at the rallies. Others that have yet to join the protests must be approached and asked to contribute. The other issue is foreign-funded NGOs that attempt to replace Thai institutions and feed the regime. These must be identified, exposed, and condemned. NGOs like Prachatai, Human Rights Watch, and the Foreign Corespondents Club of Thailand represent the insidious infiltration of Thailand by foreign interests and have become essential buttresses of the regime's power and perceived legitimacy.
IN THAILAND: It is essential that news be written and spread, in both English and Thai, to ensure a counterbalance to the distortions of regime propaganda backed by the immense influence of its Western backers. Anti-regime media must therefore be factual and consistent if it is to carry any credibility.
IN THAILAND: Below are nearly 200 methods that can be used to undermine the current Shinawatra regime. Smaller groups can pick and plan any one of these, or several at a single time. They can be implemented at any scale, however big or small - as they will simply compliment the already effective main protests going on.
The Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion:
While this book has been used by various fronts of the US State Department, the CIA, and other corporate financier-backed insurrections, it is a double-edged sword that those seeking to uproot Wall Street's various proxy regimes can also use.
The link to the book (in English) can be found here.
Below, is a summarized version of the most important information and how it relates to Thailand's current anti-regime protests. Notes added in will be in italics and begin with IN THAILAND:
This needs to be translated into Thai and broken down into even smaller, more simplified parts. More specific plans shall be developed, but these should NOT be distributed over Facebook and Twitter, but ONLY through e-mails, printing, and photocopies.
For a full background on Wall Street's Thaksin regime, please read: Thailand: Uprooting Wall Street's Proxy Regime.
For a full background on Wall Street's Thaksin regime, please read: Thailand: Uprooting Wall Street's Proxy Regime.
Chapter One - Facing Dictatorships Realistically
A regime can be removed through the concerted political economic & social defiance of the people.
Some points to be considered when facing dictatorship:
Some points to be considered when facing dictatorship:
- Constitutional and legal barriers, judicial decisions, and public opinion are normally ignored by dictators.
- Frequently foreign states will tolerate, or even positively assist, a dictatorship in order to advance their own economic or political interests.
- Foreign states also may be willing to sell out an oppressed people instead of keeping pledges to assist their liberation at the cost of another objective.
- Some foreign states will act against a dictatorship only to gain their own economic, political, or military control over the country.
IN THAILAND: In Thailand's case, the current regime has not only ignored public opinion both inside of Thailand and beyond, but is also manipulating them as well with the help of its Western sponsors and their massive media machines. It has already been established that the Shinawatra regime is heavily backed by the West, therefore any attempts by the anti-regime protesters to garner foreign support from governments in the West would be foolhardy at best.
Objectives when facing the regime include:
1 One must strengthen the oppressed population themselves in their determination, self-confidence, and resistance skills;
2 One must strengthen the independent social groups and institutions of the oppressed people;
3 One must create a powerful internal resistance force;
4 One must develop a wise grand strategic plan for liberation and implement it skillfully
Against a strong self-reliant force, given wise strategy, disciplined and courageous action, and genuine strength, the dictatorship will eventually crumble.
IN THAILAND: Building up communities with their own independent institutions for things like education, infrastructure, and development, to circumvent both the current regime's campaigns and those of its foreign sponsors' insidious "NGOs," is essential to not only ousting the regime, but pulling up the roots that have given it its sustenance for so long. Santi Asoke has done this to a certain degree, but other groups must also do likewise - perhaps augmenting organic farming and traditional homesteading with the leveraging of modern technology.
Chapter Two - The Dangers of Negotiations
Well-intended negotiators sometimes confuse the objectives of the negotiations and the negotiation process itself. Further, democratic negotiators, or foreign negotiation specialists accepted to assist in the negotiations, may in a single stroke provide the dictators with the domestic and international legitimacy that they had been previously denied because of their seizure of the state, human rights violations, and brutalities. Without that desperately needed legitimacy, the dictators cannot continue to rule indefinitely. Exponents of peace should not provide them legitimacy.
The old preconception that violent means always work quickly and nonviolent means always require vast time is clearly not valid. Although much time may be required for changes in the underlying situation and society, the actual fight against a dictatorship sometimes occurs relatively quickly by nonviolent struggle.
The old preconception that violent means always work quickly and nonviolent means always require vast time is clearly not valid. Although much time may be required for changes in the underlying situation and society, the actual fight against a dictatorship sometimes occurs relatively quickly by nonviolent struggle.
Negotiations are not the only alternative to a continuing war of annihilation on the one hand and capitulation on the other.
IN THAILAND: In Thailand's case, anti-regime protesters have been clear that they cannot accept to accommodate the current regime in any form, and that it must be taken out at the root. It appears, at least in Thailand, that protesters are already fully aware of the dangers of negotiating with the habitually dishonest and deceitful regime of Thaksin Shinawatra.
Chapter 3 Whence (From Where) Comes the Power?
What kind of power can the democratic opposition mobilize that will be sufficient to destroy the dictatorship and its vast military and police networks? The answers lie in an oft ignored understanding of political power. Learning this insight is not really so difficult a task. Some basic truths are quite simple.
These sources of political power include:
1 Authority, the belief among the people that the regime is legitimate, and that they have a moral duty to obey it;
2 Human resources, the number and importance of the persons and groups which are obeying, cooperating, or providing assistance to the rulers;
3 Skills and knowledge, needed by the regime to perform specific actions and supplied by the cooperating persons and groups;
4 Intangible factors, psychological and ideological factors that may induce people to obey and assist the rulers;
5 Material resources, the degree to which the rulers control or have access to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, and means of communication and transportation
6 Sanctions, punishments, threatened or applied, against the disobedient and noncooperative to ensure the submission and cooperation that are needed for the regime to exist and carry out its policies.
IN THAILAND: Of course boycotts have been aimed at the regime's corporate-financier interests inside of Thailand. There must also be emphasis put on foreign corporations that back Thaksin, including those sitting on the US-ASEAN Business Council (pictured above).
Another source of their power is the political machine they operate in the nation's northeast. Reaching out to the "red shirts" instead of adopting an adversarial posture, will give them options to join you as the regime and its unsustainable policies crumble. Violence between anti-regime protesters and pro-regime supporter only helps the regime galvanize support.
The regime also has considerable control over the police. Again, while the heads of police departments are deeply in the pocket of Thaksin Shinawatra, the rank and file often brought in from across the northeast to quell protests are only following orders and may not agree or support the regime as fanatically as their superiors. Offering them a hand and a way out from under despotic/illegal/inhumane orders is preferable to combative postures that only give them further reasons to fight on and follow orders.
Full cooperation, obedience, and support will increase the availability of the needed sources of power and, consequently, expand the power capacity of any government.
On the other hand, withdrawal of popular and institutional cooperation with aggressors and dictators diminishes, and may sever, the availability of the sources of power on which all rulers depend. Without availability of those sources, the rulers’ power weakens and finally dissolves.
If, despite repression, the sources of power can be restricted or severed for enough time, the initial results may be uncertainty and confusion within the dictatorship. That is likely to be followed by a clear weakening of the power of the dictatorship. Over time, the withholding of the sources of power can produce the paralysis and impotence of the regime, and in severe cases, its disintegration.
IN THAILAND: Those looking for a quick victory must understand that in any conflict, strangling the resources of the enemy is essential and may take time. Patience and creativity is required.
Three of the most important factors in determining to what degree a government’s power will be controlled or uncontrolled therefore are:
(1) the relative desire of the populace to impose limits on the government’s power;
(2) the relative strength of the subjects’ independent organizations and institutions to withdraw collectively the sources of power; and
(3) the population’s relative ability to withhold their consent and assistance.
However, if the autonomy and freedom of these independent civil institutions (outside of government control) can be maintained or regained they are highly important for the application of political defiance. The common feature of the cited examples in which dictatorships have been disintegrated or weakened has been the courageous mass application of political defiance by the population and its institutions.
As stated, these centers of power provide the institutional bases from which the population can exert pressure or can resist dictatorial controls. In the future, they will be part of the indispensable structural base for a free society. Their continued independence and growth therefore is often a prerequisite for the success of the liberation struggle.
If the dictatorship has been largely successful in destroying or controlling the society’s independent bodies, it will be important for the resisters to create new independent social groups and institutions, or to reassert democratic control over surviving or partially controlled bodies.
IN THAILAND: Thailand already has a large number of independent institutions that exist beyond the regime's control. Many can be seen at the rallies. Others that have yet to join the protests must be approached and asked to contribute. The other issue is foreign-funded NGOs that attempt to replace Thai institutions and feed the regime. These must be identified, exposed, and condemned. NGOs like Prachatai, Human Rights Watch, and the Foreign Corespondents Club of Thailand represent the insidious infiltration of Thailand by foreign interests and have become essential buttresses of the regime's power and perceived legitimacy.
Chapter Four - Dictatorships Have Weaknesses
Among the weaknesses of dictatorships are the following:
1. The cooperation of a multitude of people, groups, and institutions needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn.
2. The requirements and effects of the regime’s past policies will somewhat limit its present ability to adopt and implement conflicting policies.
3. The system may become routine in its operation, less able to adjust quickly to new situations.
4. Personnel and resources already allocated for existing tasks will not be easily available for new needs.
5. Subordinates fearful of displeasing their superiors may not report accurate or complete information needed by the dictators to make decisions.
6. The ideology may erode, and myths and symbols of the system may become unstable.
7. If a strong ideology is present that influences one’s view of reality, firm adherence to it may cause inattention to actual conditions and needs.
8. Deteriorating efficiency and competency of the bureaucracy, or excessive controls and regulations, may make the system’s policies and operation ineffective.
9. Internal institutional conflicts and personal rivalries and hostilities may harm, and even disrupt, the operation of the dictatorship.
10. Intellectuals and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions, doctrinalism, and repression.
11. The general public may over time become apathetic, skeptical, and even hostile to the regime.
12. Regional, class, cultural, or national differences may become acute.
13. The power hierarchy of the dictatorship is always unstable to some degree, and at times extremely so. Individuals do not only remain in the same position in the ranking, but may rise or fall to other ranks or be removed entirely and replaced by new persons.
14. Sections of the police or military forces may act to achieve their own objectives, even against the will of established dictators, including by coup d’état.
15. If the dictatorship is new, time is required for it to become well established.
16. With so many decisions made by so few people in the dictatorship, mistakes of judgment, policy, and action are likely to occur.
17. If the regime seeks to avoid these dangers and decentralizes controls and decision making, its control over the central levers of power may be further eroded.
IN THAILAND: Number 14 is most important as it admits that military coups are more than acceptable outcomes when attempting to overthrow a regime. While this is considered "ok" when it is the West attempting to overthrow a targeted nation, the Western media now condemns the notion of a coup in Thailand solely because it would mean the end to their proxy regime.
Chapter Five - Exercising Power
Political defiance has the following characteristics:
• It does not accept that the outcome will be decided by the means of fighting chosen by the dictatorship.
• It is difficult for the regime to combat.
• It can uniquely aggravate weaknesses of the dictatorship and can sever its sources of power.
• It can in action be widely dispersed but can also be concentrated on a specific objective.
• It leads to errors of judgment and action by the dictators.
• It can effectively utilize the population as a whole and the society’s groups and institutions in the struggle to end the brutal domination of the few.
• It helps to spread the distribution of effective power in the society, making the establishment and maintenance of a democratic society more possible.
Nonviolent struggle is a much more complex and varied means of struggle than is violence. Instead, the struggle is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons applied
by the population and the institutions of the society. These have been known under various names of protests, strikes, noncooperation, boycotts, disaffection, and people power. As noted earlier, all governments can rule only as long as they receive replenishment of the needed sources of their power from the cooperation, submission, and obedience of the population and the institutions of the society. Political defiance, unlike violence, is uniquely suited to severing those sources of power.
IN THAILAND: Widespread defiance forces the regime to react. As long as the regime is reacting, it has no ability to conceive or execute its own plans against protesters. The process of constantly imposing the protesters' will upon the regime, rather than the other way around, maintains strategic superiority.
Chapter Six - The Need for Strategic Planning
If one wishes to accomplish something, it is wise to plan how to do it. The more important the goal, or the graver the consequences of failure, the more important planning becomes. Strategic planning increases the likelihood that all available resources will be mobilized and employed most effectively. This is especially true for a democratic movement – which has limited material resources and whose supporters will be in danger – that is trying to bring down a powerful dictatorship. In contrast, the dictatorship usually will have access to vast material resources, organizational strength, and ability to perpetrate brutalities.
In order to help us to think strategically, clarity about the meanings of four basic terms is important:
1 Grand strategy is the conception that serves to coordinate and direct the use of all appropriate and available resources (economic, human, moral, political, organizational, etc.) of a group seeking to attain its objectives in a conflict.
2. Strategy is the conception of how best to achieve particular objectives in a conflict, operating within the scope of the chosen grand strategy. Strategy is concerned with whether, when, and how to fight, as well as how to achieve maximum effectiveness in struggling for certain ends. A strategy has been compared to the artist’s concept, while a strategic plan is the architect’s blueprint.
3. Tactics and methods of action are used to implement the strategy. Tactics relate to the skillful use of one’s forces to the best advantage in a limited situation. A tactic is a limited action, employed to achieve a restricted objective. The choice of tactics is governed by the conception of how best in a restricted phase of a conflict to utilize the available means of fighting to implement the strategy. To be most effective, tactics and methods must be chosen and applied with constant attention to the achievement of strategic objectives. Tactical gains that do not reinforce the attainment of strategic objectives may in the end turn out to be wasted energy.
4. Method refers to the specific weapons or means of action. Within the technique of nonviolent struggle, these include the dozens of particular forms of action (such as the many kinds of strikes, boycotts, political noncooperation, and the like) cited in Chapter Five. (See also Appendix below)
Image: Using the West's insidious "color revolution" tactics against it, anti-regime protesters in Thailand could just as easily replicate methods used by US State Department-funded activists in Egypt. In this image, we see a strategy of moving through alleyways shouting slogans to build up a crowd before moving into the main streets with a fully formed protest. It could be one method used to augment further mass demonstrations against the Wall Street-backed Shinawatra regime.
Image: Using the West's insidious "color revolution" tactics against it, anti-regime protesters in Thailand could just as easily replicate methods used by US State Department-funded activists in Egypt. In this image, we see a strategy of moving through alleyways shouting slogans to build up a crowd before moving into the main streets with a fully formed protest. It could be one method used to augment further mass demonstrations against the Wall Street-backed Shinawatra regime.
....
IN THAILAND: The overall "grand strategy has been defined. Even smaller actions are being planned and executed by the anti-regime leadership. Smaller independent groups can begin thinking of small operations to undermine the current regime by using the methods described below in the appendix. These must be planned, and if possible, coordinated with the larger rallying groups. Nothing should be done that would undermine the overall grand strategy. In Chapter 7 (below) more information is given on what considerations should be made while planning.
Chapter 7 - Planning Strategy
Particularly, strategists will need to answer many fundamental questions, such as these:
• What are the main obstacles to achieving freedom?
• What factors will facilitate achieving freedom?
• What are the main strengths of the dictatorship?
• What are the various weaknesses of the dictatorship?
• To what degree are the sources of power for the dictatorship vulnerable?
• What are the strengths of the democratic forces and the general population?
• What are the weaknesses of the democratic forces and how
can they be corrected?
• What is the status of third parties, not immediately involved in the conflict, who already assist or might assist, either the dictatorship or the democratic movement, and if so in what ways?
In planning the strategies for the specific selective resistance campaigns and for the longer term development of the liberation struggle, the political defiance strategists will need to consider various issues and problems.
The following are among these:
• Determination of the specific objectives of the campaign and their contributions to implementing the grand strategy.
• Consideration of the specific methods, or political weapons, that can best be used to implement the chosen strategies. Within each overall plan for a particular strategic campaign it will be necessary to determine what smaller, tactical plans and which specific methods of action should be used to impose pressures and restrictions against the dictatorship’s sources of power. It should be remembered that the achievement of major objectives will come as a result of carefully chosen and implemented specific smaller steps.
• Determination whether, or how, economic issues should be related to the overall essentially political struggle. If economic issues are to be prominent in the struggle, care will be needed that the economic grievances can actually be remedied after the dictatorship is ended. Otherwise, disillusionment and disaffection may set in if quick solutions are not provided during the transition period to a democratic society. Such disillusionment could facilitate the rise of dictatorial forces promising an end to economic woes.
• Determination in advance of what kind of leadership structure and communications system will work best for initiating the resistance struggle. What means of decision-making and communication will be possible during the course of the struggle to give continuing guidance to the resisters and the general population?
• Communication of the resistance news to the general population, to the dictators’ forces, and the international press. Claims and reporting should always be strictly factual. Exaggerations and unfounded claims will undermine the credibility of the resistance.
• Plans for self-reliant constructive social, educational, economic, and political activities to meet the needs of one’s own people during the coming conflict. Such projects can be conducted by persons not directly involved in the resistance activities.
• Determination of what kind of external assistance is desirable in support of the specific campaign or the general liberation struggle. How can external help be best mobilized and used without making the internal struggle dependent on uncertain external factors? Attention will need to be given to which external groups are most likely, and most appropriate, to assist, such as non-governmental organizations (social movements, religious or political groups, labor unions, etc.), governments, and/or the United Nations and its various bodies.
The anti-regime protests much ensure their activities help, not hurt the majority, including those living and working near the rally site, as well as the greater population of Thailand. It must be made clear that the regime's clinging to power, not the protests, are the cause of any negative consequences stemming from the conflict.
Spreading the idea of noncooperation
For successful political defiance against a dictatorship. The basic idea is simple: if enough of the subordinates refuse to continue their cooperation long enough despite repression, the oppressive system will be weakened and finally collapse.
Chapter 9 - Disintegrating the Dictatorship
The cumulative effect of well-conducted and successful political defiance campaigns is to strengthen the resistance and to establish and expand areas of the society where the dictatorship faces limits on its effective control. These campaigns also provide important experience in how to refuse cooperation and how to offer political defiance. That experience will be of great assistance when the time comes for noncooperation and defiance on a mass scale.
Planners of the grand strategy should calculate in advance the possible and preferred ways in which a successful struggle might best be concluded in order to prevent the rise of a new dictatorship and to ensure the gradual establishment of a durable democratic system.
The democrats should calculate how the transition from the dictatorship to the interim government shall be handled at the end of the struggle. It is desirable at that time to establish quickly a new functioning government. However, it must not be merely the old one with new personnel. It is necessary to calculate what sections of the old governmental structure (as the political police) are to be completely abolished because of their inherent anti-democratic character and which sections retained to be subjected to later democratization.
IN THAILAND: Anti-regime protests may want to develop their road map more clearly for what it plans to do once the Shinawatra regime is removed from power. It must be implemented in such a way so that no proxy of the regime can simply take over the reigns, and so that no other "Shinawatra-like" entity can similarly hijack the nation.
By developing the anti-regime protesters into local institutions that are decentralized and actively maintained (though perhaps for different reasons when not protesting) presents any future potential dictatorship with a credible deterrence against extralegal attempts to consolidate and abuse power.
CONCLUSION
There are three major conclusions to the ideas sketched here:
• Liberation from dictatorships is possible;
• Very careful thought and strategic planning will be required to achieve it; and
• Vigilance, hard work, and disciplined struggle, often at great cost, will be needed.efforts. A complete governmental void could open the way to chaos
APPENDIX ONE
The goal is to illustrate the regime's illegitimacy. Force it to reveal what it really is in front of the local and international press. Cameras should always be on hand when executing these methods, and blogs prepared to report on them in both Thai and English.
The Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion:
Formal statements:
1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions
Communications with a wider audience:
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting
Group representations:
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections
Symbolic public acts:
18. Display of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures
Pressures on individuals:
31. “Haunting” officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils
Drama and music:
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performance of plays and music
37. Singing processions
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades
Honoring the dead:
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places
Public assemblies:
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins
Withdrawal and renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one’s back
The methods of social noncooperation:
Ostracism of persons:
Ostracism of persons:
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions
Withdrawal from the social system:
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. Flight of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)
the methoDs oF economic noncooperation:
(1) economic boycotts
action by consumers
71. Consumers’ boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers’ boycott
77. International consumers’ boycott
action by workers and producers
78. Workmen’s boycott
79. Producers’ boycott
Action by middlemen:
80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott
Action by owners and management:
81. Traders’ boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants’ “general strike”
Action by holders of financial resources:
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government’s money
Action by governments:
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers’ embargo
95. International buyers’ embargo
96. International trade embargo
The methods of economic noncooperation:
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)
Agricultural strikes:
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm workers’ strike
Strikes by special groups:
101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners’ strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike
Ordinary industrial strikes:
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike
Restricted strikes:
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting “sick” (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike
Multi-industry strikes:
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike
Combinations of strikes and economic closures:
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown
The methods of political noncooperation rejection of authority:
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance
Citizens’ noncooperation with government:
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions
Citizens’ alternatives to obedience:
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws
Action by government personnel:
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny
Domestic governmental action:
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units
International governmental action:
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations
The methods of nonviolent intervention psychological intervention:
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
(a) Fast of moral pressure
(b) Hunger strike
(c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment
Physical intervention:
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation
Social intervention:
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system
Economic intervention:
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions
Political intervention:
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government
